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Volition and Action in the Human Brain: Processes,
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Humans seem to decide for themselves what to do, and when to do it. This distinctive capacity may emerge from an ability, shared with
other animals, to make decisions for action that are related to future goals, or at least free from the constraints of immediate environ-
mental inputs. Studying such volitional acts proves a major challenge for neuroscience. This review highlights key mechanisms in the
generationofvoluntary, asopposed tostimulus-drivenactions, andhighlights three issues.The firstpart focuseson theapparent spontaneityof
voluntaryaction.Thesecondpart focusesononeof themostdistinctive,butelusive, featuresofvolition,namely, its linktoconsciousexperience,
and reviews stimulation and patient studies of the cortical basis of conscious volition down to the single-neuron level. Finally, we consider the
goal-directedness of voluntary action, and discuss how internal generation of action can be linked to goals and reasons.
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Introduction
How to define voluntary action? Neuroanatomical descriptions
since Sherrington (1906) refer to a voluntary motor pathway,
centered on the “final commonpath” through the primarymotor
cortex. Neurophysiological accounts refer to internal generation,
as opposed to external triggering, of motor action (Passingham,
1987; Passingham et al., 2010). Moreover, internal generation of
actionwas localized toMFC,whichmay bridge between the subcor-
tical structures for motivation and motor drive, and the primary
motor cortex. These accounts did not define the cause of internally
generated actions, so are effectively definitions by exclusion. Some
computational accounts have also invoked definitions by exclusion,
aswhenreferring to“freedomfromimmediacy” indecision-making
(Gold and Shadlen, 2003). Thus, no general, satisfactory, positive
definition of voluntary action exists.
Nevertheless, compelling evidence from direct brain stimula-
tion demonstrates a distinctive neural mechanism of volition.
Stimulation of distinct cortical areas in neurosurgical patients
sometimes produces sensations described as “urge to move”
a specific body part (Fried et al., 1991; Desmurget et al., 2009).
This sensation occurs without any movement of the correspond-
ing effector, butwhenhigher current levels are applied at an “urge
site,” the corresponding effector will often move (Fried et al.,
1991; Haggard, 2011). These effects are associated with stimula-
tion of the supplementary and presupplementary motor areas.
When such stimulations additionally evoke an overt movement,
the patients experience “ownership” with respect to the move-
ment. This contrastswith stimulations of the primarymotor area,
where patients clearly “disown” the movement and perceive it as
externally imposed. Although it remains unclear precisely which
cortical regions are preferentially associated with this “artificial
volition,” the phenomenon itself seems robust. Based on such
findings, we suggest a cluster of several distinctive features of
volitional actions, which help to distinguish them from other
classes of movement (Table 1). Interestingly, most of these fea-
tures of voluntary movement can be linked to a specific neuro-
anatomical or neurophysiological substrate.
Neurophysiological studies to date have generally focused
on just one feature of voluntary actions, namely, their inter-
nally generated quality. In this paper, we review recent re-
search focusing on three other key features. The first section
deals with the question of spontaneity and predictability, and
discusses how a stochastic neural process may account for the
timing of voluntary actions. The second section deals with the
link to conscious experience, and the third section deals with
goal-directedness.
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The neural process of internal generation
Most people feel they know when their acts are voluntary, and
when they are not. This first-person certainty betrays the fact that
the notion of voluntary action is tightly intertwined with the
phenomenon of consciousness: most perspectives on voluntary
action appeal to some notion of conscious control, and it is dif-
ficult to approach the concept of voluntary action without some
mention of consciousness. A recent theory of consciousness
holds that consciousness is a perceptual attribution (Graziano
and Kastner, 2011): we attribute consciousness in general, and
conscious perceptual states in particular, to beings, including
ourselves, precisely when we perceive those beings or those states
as being conscious. Thus, echoing a prior philosophical idea
(Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992), this theory holds that there is
no fact of the matter about consciousness per se. The only rele-
vant fact is whether or not we perceive an agent or a state as being
conscious.
One might argue that the same also holds true for voluntary
action: what makes an action (our own or that of another) “vol-
untary” is simply that we perceive it to be so. The first-person is
the principal and ultimate arbiter of volition. According to this
view, “voluntary action” is a perceptual category in much the
same way that “face” or “tree” is a perceptual category: it may or
may not refer to a well-defined category in nature. Interestingly,
“involuntary” may be a better-defined perceptual category than
“voluntary.” Thus, a useful scientific approach to volition in-
volves comparing actions that one would perceive to be involun-
tary and then pointing to what is left over in voluntary actions, a
definition by exclusion (Wittgenstein, 1967). This project would
likely lead to excluding highly automatized behaviors, simple re-
flexes (including swatting a mosquito), tics, and tremors. One
might also be tempted to exclude otherwise voluntary actions
performed under duress, although one would not necessarily
consider actions performed under duress to be “involuntary.”
Such actions may be a special case of volitional control being
influenced by an external imperative, and so these would remain
in the “voluntary” category. The question ofwhether such actions
should be treated as voluntary or not has been viewed as directly
relevant to their legal status (Caspar et al., 2016). Certain re-
sponses to sensory cues may still be perceived as voluntary ac-
cording to this definition (e.g., willingly performing an action
after being instructed to do so). Nevertheless, the canonical form
of voluntary action is self-initiated action (SIA), which we define
as voluntary action initiated without any sensory cue.
One early paradigm for studying SIAs required participants to
perform a specific movement (e.g., extension of the index finger)
repeatedly at irregular intervals of at least 15 or 20 s. Using this
paradigm, Kornhuber and Deecke (2016) discovered the cortical
Bereitschaftspotential or “readiness potential” (RP), a slow buildup
of scalp electrical potential preceding SIAs. Although this para-
digm is effective in revealing this particular neural signal, it lacks
ecological validity. For example, choice regarding whether and
how to act is lacking, so itmight be seen as a self-pacedmovement
task rather than a true SIA task. However, other, perhaps richer
tasks can also elicit a RP in the movement-locked average. Re-
cently, a variant of a classical “patch-leaving” task has been used
to study SIAs (Khalighinejad et al., 2017) and has been shown to
elicit a clear RP.
The RP has long been presumed to reflect a process of “plan-
ning and preparation for movement” and is often considered to
be a hallmark of voluntary action, but this interpretation has
recently been challenged. Schurger et al. (2012) have proposed
that the continual background ebb and flow of brain activity
influences when voluntary actions will occur. These fluctuations
continually bring the motor system closer to or farther from a
threshold for movement initiation, so that movement onset is
more likelywhen these fluctuations happen to near the threshold.
Thus, the RPmight simply reflect random fluctuations of the auto-
correlated EEG signal, caught in the “flash photo” of movement-
locked averaging. This account has been used to explain the
characteristic appearance of the mean RP (Schurger et al., 2012;
Khalighinejad et al., 2017).
More recently Fried et al. (2011) found that voluntary action is
preceded by progressive recruitment ofmedial frontal neurons in
the SMA, pre-SMA, and anterior cingulate cortex. As the point of
reported conscious volition (W) is approached, more neurons
join in, and these neurons gradually increase or decrease their
firing rate. Prediction of the presence and timing of W is more
accurate asW is approached, and can bemodeled as an “Integrate
and Fire” model (Fried et al., 2011). In this model, volition
emerges once a change in internally generated firing rates of neu-
ronal assemblies crosses a threshold.
The alternative interpretation of the RP, and associated neu-
ronal buildup and recruitment, challenges its status as a marker
of volition. The challenge revives the classic question of when, in
the time course leading up to an SIA, is the final neuronal com-
mitment to trigger the action. A simple theory might link RP
onset to the decision to act (Libet et al., 1983), but RP onset was
variable across different studies, andmoreover variedwidelywith
the measurement technique used. This may be because the early
tail of the RP primarily reflects random autocorrelated fluctua-
tions in neural activity, and thus has no “onset” event per se.
Rather, it extends arbitrarily far back in time, decaying exponen-
tially or according to a power law. The temporal relationship
between the RP and the estimated time of the subjective decision
to act was previously used to argue that the conscious decision to
act cannot possibly be responsible for the action because the
onset of the RP precedes the estimated time of the subjective
decision by hundreds of milliseconds (Libet et al., 1983). The
new challenge from fluctuation models renders this argument
suspect.
If voluntary action is reliably linked to a specific process in the
brain, then in principle “voluntary action” could be defined as
any action that is preceded by and caused by such a neural state.
But if the RP does not reflect such a state, then either we must
look for another putative correlate or else consider that “volun-
tary action”may not be a well-defined category in terms of neural
phenomena. Rather, it may be a perceptual attribution: an action
is voluntary if and only if it is perceived by the agent as being
voluntary. This perception presumably must have some neural
basis (unless one is a dualist). However, it seems important to
distinguish the scientific project of searching for neural mech-
anisms of SIAs, from the project of searching for neural mech-
anisms of actions perceived as voluntary. This distinction is
Table 1. Key features of volitional controla
Key feature of volitional
control
Constraint on neuroanatomical bases of volitional
control
Leads to movement Strong connections to motor areas
Reasons-responsive Strong connections from valence/reward circuits
Outcome/goal-directed Strong connections to/from planning/monitoring areas
No external trigger Weak connections from sensory areas
Innovative/spontaneous Independence from subcortical “habitual” circuits
Involves consciousness Neural basis remains controversial: frontal or parietal?
aNo single feature is strictly necessary for an action to be volitional, but a subset of featuresmay be jointly sufficient.
Each feature imposes a constraint on brain circuitry for volitional control.
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highlighted by a number of clinical conditions, which show that
apparently voluntary actions may be perceived as involuntary
(see below).
Neurological alterations of conscious intention
Consciousness of volition is fundamental to the experience of
healthy adult humans. It provides the foundation for an individ-
ual to attribute agency to the self, and for society to attribute
responsibility to an individual. What makes a movement feel
voluntary, and what might make it feel involuntary? Studies of
several neurological and psychiatric conditions have helped to
answer this question because the behavior of these patients is
consistent with an altered experience of volition.
The conditions of schizophrenia, alien hand syndrome (AHS),
and psychogenic movement disorders (Scepkowski and Cronin-
Golomb, 2003; Jeannerod, 2009; Hallett et al., 2012) all provide
crucial evidence regarding the neurobiological basis of volition.
This evidence is of clinical and even legal significance, as well as
scientific significance. In this section, we describe the cross-
fertilization between basic and clinical neuroscience in under-
standing volition.
Psychogenic movement disorders, also referred to as “func-
tional” or “nonorganic” movement disorders, fall into the cate-
gory of (currently) medically unexplained symptoms. A patient
with psychogenic movement disorder presents unwantedmuscle
movement, such as tremor or dystonic posturing, which cannot
be voluntarily controlled. Despite being experienced by the pa-
tient as involuntary, the abnormal movements share certain
characteristics with volitional movement. For example, psycho-
genic movements are susceptible to distraction and entrainment,
such that asking the patient to perform a demanding voluntary
task will temporarily stop the unwanted psychogenic move-
ments, and tapping with their unaffected hand will entrain their
psychogenicmovement to the same frequency (Kranick andHal-
lett, 2013). By contrast, abnormal movements of patients with
organicmovement disorders (i.e., thosewith knownneurological
causes) are not affected by such distractions. Brain imaging also
suggests that psychogenic movements share neural mechanisms
with voluntarymovements, as shown by a “motor RP” preceding
the movement, which can be measured using EEG (Terada et al.,
1995; Kranick and Hallett, 2013). So, why do these patients deny
having any control over movements that, from a neurophysio-
logical perspective, appear volitional?
One recent study with healthy volunteers sheds light on pos-
sible pathological mechanisms underlying distorted volition in
psychogenic movement disorders. Douglas et al. (2015) asked
healthy volunteers to perform self-generated movements during
anodal or sham high-definition transcranial direct current stim-
ulation (HD-tDCS). The volunteers reported the timing of the
movement (“M-time”) or intention (“W-time”) by repositioning
the hand of a rotating clock (Libet et al., 1983) to the position
when they actually moved (M), or when they first became aware
of the intention to move (W). In previous studies, volunteers
reported M-time and W-time at 70 ms and 200 ms before
movement onset, respectively (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard, 2008).
Interestingly, patients with psychogenic tremors, the most prev-
alent (30%–40%) form of psychogenic movement disorder, re-
port W-times that are much closer to movement onset, as if they
lacked awareness of their impending voluntary movement until
just before actually moving (Edwards et al., 2011).
Douglas et al. (2015) observed that a single 20 min session of
anodal HD-tDCS, designed to enhance neural excitability in ei-
ther the left angular gyrus (AG) or the left primary motor cortex
(M1), caused the reported time ofmovement intention (W-time)
to be 60–70 ms earlier than under sham stimulation. There was
no effect on M-time or on the movement itself. Using EEG re-
cording, they identified the brain processes underlying this be-
havioral effect: slow brain waves recorded 2–3 s before, as well as
hundreds of milliseconds after, movement onset, independently
correlated with the tDCS-induced modulation of W-time. These
together accounted for 81% of the variance in the W judgments.
The results suggest that conscious intention depends on brain
processes extended over several seconds. The stimulation further
showed that neural circuits underlying conscious intention can
be manipulated independently from movement itself.
Previous lesion and cortical stimulation studies implicated the
AG in generating conscious movement intention (Sirigu et al.,
2004; Desmurget et al., 2009). Importantly, patients with psycho-
genic tremors exhibit hypoactivity of theAGduring their psycho-
genic tremors, comparedwith their voluntarymovements (Voon
et al., 2010). This raises the intriguing possibility that during
psychogenic tremors, abnormally low activity in AG reflects
weakenedmovement intention, and, in turn, the patient’s lack of
sense of volition.
AHS is a neurological condition in which patients experience
their limbmovements as unaccompanied by any sense of agency.
Three variants of AHS have been described: frontal, posterior,
and callosal (Hassan and Josephs, 2016). In Figure 1, we outline a
preliminary diagram of the neural circuitry underlying voluntary
movement, inspired by the computational model put forward by
Douglas et al. (2015), and indicate the location of cortical damage
in the three variants of AHS.
The frontal variant of AHS typically arises from damage to the
dominant (left) hemisphere in the SMA, anterior cingulate gyrus,
or medial prefrontal cortex. The affected limb tends to reach and
grasp for objects that are in the visual field (i.e., the unwanted
movements are in response to external cues). These patients are
aware that the alien limb belongs to them but are unable to sup-
press its unwanted movements, which are moreover experienced
as involuntary (Hassan and Josephs, 2016).
The posterior variant of AHS typically involves damage to the
nondominant (right) parietal lobe and affects the left hand. In
contrast with the other variants, these patients have a strong sense
of estrangement or disownership regarding the affected limb, and
execute simplermovements, such as arm levitation. Brain regions
active during alien and voluntarymovements of the affected limb
were examined using fMRI in a patient with a right parietal lobe
lesion (Assal et al., 2007). Alien movements of the left limb were
associated with isolated activity in the right M1, whereas volun-
tary movements were associated with a distributed network in-
volving the M1, premotor cortex, and the inferior parietal lobule
(IPL). The activity of the right M1 was not significantly different
between alien and voluntary movements. This suggests that the
alien movement was related to M1 activity when released from
intentional control by the IPL. The patient was also often un-
aware of his alien movements. This could have been due to the
impaired ability of the IPL to process sensory feedback (Farrer
et al., 2003; Nahab et al., 2011) or secondary to spatial neglect (He
et al., 2007).
Last, the callosal variant of AHS exclusively affects the non-
dominant (left hand) in right-handed patients and is mostly
caused by isolated corpus callosum injury (Hassan and Josephs,
2016). This variant is characterized by intermanual conflicts, with
minimal limb weakness and absence of frontal features. Overall,
AHS demonstrates an interesting hemispheric asymmetry in
which frontal and posterior variants tend to involve dominant
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and nondominant hemispheres, respectively, and disconnec-
tion of the two hemispheres seems to affect exclusively the non-
dominant hand. Although healthy volunteers are entirely able to
generate voluntary movements of either the right or the left hand
(indeed, this ability has been used as amarker of volition) (Brasil-
Neto et al., 1992), these observations suggest that the capacity for
volition may be distributed unequally across the cerebral
hemispheres.
Goals and control: what is voluntary action for?
Investigations of volition in human cognitive neuroscience often
begin by distinguishing internally generated action from exter-
nally triggered action (Passingham, 1987). However, the charac-
teristic feature of human voluntary action, in contrast to other
animals, may be in how the capacity for internal generation is
used. In this section, we link volition to the neurocognitive
concept of goal-directed action. People and animals often
make actions for a reason (Anscombe, 1957). The concept of
goal-directed action in animal cognition (Dickinson and Bal-
leine, 2002) overlaps with the concept of voluntary action in the
crucial respects of absence of external trigger stimuli, and
presence of reasons. Goal-directed action requires both an
incentive or motivation, and an acquired instrumental knowl-
edge of how specific motor actions can achieve the incen-
tivised outcome (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Through
biological evolution, and perhaps through cultural evolution
also, the neurocognitive mechanisms of human voluntary ac-
tion have developed markedly beyond those of other animals.
The striking sophistication of human voluntary action is clear
in both the incentive/motivational, and the instrumental as-
pects of action control (Fig. 2).
First, on the motivational side, the
goals or outcomes of voluntary action are
more varied, andmore flexible in humans
than in animals. In animal studies, goal-
directed actions classically involve search
for primary reinforcers (food, water, etc.).
In humans, voluntary actions may be di-
rected at more abstract goals, or “higher”
needs (Maslow, 1954). Indeed, human-
specific cultural actions, such as artistic
expression, are often taken as paradigm
cases of human voluntary action. Al-
though such actions may account for only
a tiny proportion of human goal-directed
actions, they are of particular interest to
cognitive neuroscience.
Second, on the instrumental side, the
human brain supports much more com-
plex relations between means and ends
than is the case for other animals. Hebb
(1949) emphasized the importance of
what he called “motor equivalence” or
“motor equifinality” in control of action.
There are typically several differentmeans
to achieve any given action goal. For ex-
ample, in a striking instance of motor
equifinality, stimulating motor cortical
areas in nonhuman primates caused arm
movements to the same final posture, in-
dependent of starting posture (Graziano
et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the brain must
generate just one single, specific action,
using an inverse model for action selection (Ghahramani and
Wolpert, 1997; Rowe and Passingham, 2001). In humans, this
flexibility of means-ends linkage, and the computational com-
plexity of the resulting action selection problem, seem unlimited.
The human capacity for future thinking and simulation enables
distant goals (e.g., a successful career), which can be achieved
in many ways. The hierarchical organization of many human
voluntary actions may be essential to this flexibility (Koechlin
et al., 2003).
Action-generation and decision-making are often studied in
stimulus-driven situations, which typically underestimate the de-
gree of internal generation of information involved in human
volition. Here we take one illustrative paradigm from model-
based reinforcement learning. Participants first chose between
two stimuli, which are probabilistically mapped to two further
pairs of stimuli, which always differ in expected action value.
Model-based decision-making implies selecting the first action
taking into account the expected value of reward in responding to
second-stage stimuli. The probability structure of the transition
between the first and second stages allows mere habitual repeti-
tion of previously rewarded actions to be distinguished from de-
liberate planning to achieve the optimal outcome.
In these studies, the reward is typically money, the number of
steps between action and goal is typically small (i.e., 2), and the
number of possible choices is also small (i.e., 2). However, the
architecture resembles more complex policies, involving a wider
range of choices, that are typically considered voluntary, and for
which we hold people responsible (Shadlen and Roskies, 2012).
On this view, the distinguishing cognitive feature of voluntary
action, as of model-based decision-making, might simply be
“think before you act.” Neuroimaging studies point to the frontal
Figure 1. A proposed diagram for the neural circuit underlying normal and abnormal voluntary movement, following the
computationalmodel put forward by Douglas et al. (2015). In brief, IPL sends a sustained excitatory input tomotor, premotor, and
SMAareas starting fromseconds beforemovement onset. SMA sends an excitatory input toM1moreproximal tomovement onset,
releasing the M1 from inhibition by basal ganglia (BG). Accompanying movement execution, AG receives a net-inhibitory input
fromM1 corresponding to the efference copy, and compares state estimates computed fromefference copywith sensory feedback
for online error correction (Wolpert et al., 1995; Desmurget et al., 1999). Red fonts indicate the location of cortical damage in three
variants of AHS: Fx, Frontal variant; Cx, callosal variant; Px, posterior variant.
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and prefrontal cortices as critical nodes for model-based, as op-
posed to model-free, decision-making (Doll et al., 2015).
Recent cognitive neuroscience studies confirm the dual foun-
dations of volition in motivational and instrumental processes.
Interestingly, these studies further show that the characteristic
subjective experience of agency that accompanies voluntary ac-
tion (i.e., the feeling that one controls at will one’s own actions,
and, through them, events in the outside world) depends on both
motivational factors (caring about outcomes) and instrumental
factors (ability to control outcomes). Borhani et al. (2017) used
the intentional binding effect to investigate the motivational and
instrumental aspects of voluntary control. In intentional binding,
a voluntary action and an outcome occurring shortly afterward
are perceived as shifted toward each other in time. In contrast, a
physically similar involuntary movement evoked by transcranial
magnetic stimulation, and followed by a similar outcome, show
no such binding (Haggard et al., 2002). Borhani et al. (2017)
asked participants to choose between one of two actions that were
probabilistically mapped onto lower or higher levels of laser-
evoked radiant heat pain. The participants were, unsurprisingly,
motivated to reduce pain. Further, they showed stronger inten-
tional binding, implying a stronger subjective sense of agency,
when they could freely choose between actions and pain levels,
than when their choice was instructed. That is, volitional de-
cision regarding which action to make, to achieve a desired
goal of reducing pain, produced stronger subjective experi-
ence of agency and control. This study highlights the impor-
tance for the experience of volition of internally generating
information about which specific action to make, based on
motivational goal.
A second study, focused specifically on this action selection
process, and again linked the information-generation process to
the subjective sense of agency. Khalighinejad et al. (2016) studied
the shift in the perceived timeof action toward outcome (one part
of the intentional binding effect), across seven separate tDCS
experiments, and used meta-analysis to investigate the pattern of
results. They found that anodal tDCS over left DLPFC systemat-
ically increased this intentional binding effect in studies involving
an element of action selection.
Thus, a distinctive feature of human voluntary action involves
thinking ahead about which of several actions to make to achieve
a desired goal, in the absence, or relative absence, of external
guidance. In this sense, volition and planning seem inseparable
(Stuss and Alexander, 2007). These thought processes are associ-
ated with a distinctive subjective experience, which has been de-
scribed as a metacognitive sense of agency (Metcalfe and Greene,
2007). The neuroscientific evidence suggests that the frontal and
prefrontal cortex play a crucial role in the goal-directed aspects of
human voluntary action. Scientific discussions of the neural and
experiential aspects of voluntary action cannot ignore goal-
directedness. While parietal circuits seem to underpin the sense
that the current action is mine, the frontal and prefrontal lobes
seem crucial for the sense of what the action is for.
In conclusion, volition has historically been the domain of
philosophical, rather than scientific, inquiry. However, an im-
portant tradition in systems neuroscience, inspired by the clinical
neurology of the motor system, has long recognized a distinct
class of actions that differ from reflexes in being relatively stimulus-
independent, or “internally generated.” Internally generated action
remains a compelling construct formodern neuroscience and pro-
vides a useful operational definition for neuroscientific studies of
human volition. Current research suggests that volitional control
circuits are widely distributed in the brain, across the frontal and
parietal lobes. However, the neurocomputational basis of voli-
tion, which may comprise both stochastic and deterministic
components, remains an active research topic. Cognitive models
point to a crucial role of both motivational and instrumental
mechanisms in volition. Previous research traditions looking for
a single neural center for human volitionmay have underestimated
the distributed,multicomponent nature of volition. Indeed, “classi-
cal” paradigms for studying self-initiated action seem to lack
ecological validity. New paradigms based on ecological self-
generated actions, such as patch-leaving, may better capture ev-
eryday human volition, and have already identified potential
Figure 2. Volitional control involves representing, and then exploiting, regularities in the relation between actions and outcomes. The subjective experience is also influenced by both
motivational (goals) and instrumental (action selection) processes.
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neural precursors (Khalighinejad et al., 2017). Experimental
methodology remains a key challenge for this intriguing and im-
portant neuroscientific research field.
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